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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper addresses the delicate issue of public interest considerations when determining anti-
dumping, competition, and investment measures to balance it with the interest of other interested 
parties in South Africa. It is particularly argued that the South African anti-dumping legislation 
must be amended as to clearly mandate the consideration of public interest when imposing an 
anti-dumping (or safeguard measure). Also, it is argued that the foreign direct investment regime 
must take into account policy considerations such as black economic empowerment in the public 
interest.  The South Africa’s competition legislation will be used as an example of the level of 
convergence that may be achieved having regard to the non-competition factors incorporated in 
the legislation and potential or perceived difficulties in reconciling a competition analysis with a 
public interest analysis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ublic interest considerations weigh more heavily in developing countries than they do in developed 
countries.  The reasons for this are instructive: first, it is widely accepted that there is a greater role 
for industrial policy, for targeting support at strategically selected sectors or interest groups, in 
developing than in developed countries; secondly, developing country competition authorities are still engaged in a 
very basic struggle to achieve credibility and legitimacy in their countries…(Lewis, 2002, p.2) 
 
This paper is intended to provide an overview of public interest considerations when determining anti-
dumping, competition or anti-trust, and investment measures in South Africa. Anti-dumping, anti-competition, and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) measures often raises fundamental issues of public interest, often requiring due 
regard to other issues such as employment, redressing the socio-economic imbalances that exist due to the 
ramifications of the past Apartheid policies.  The government of South Africa (GoSA), for example, requires that the 
foreign direct investment regime must take into account policy considerations such as black economic 
empowerment in the public interest.  Public interest considerations have particularly re-emerged strongly “when 
fashioning and negotiating merger remedies in the case of multi-jurisdictional and cross-border mergers” (Oxenham, 
2012 p.212) pursuant to the Competition Act of 1998.  This position, argued Oxenham (2012) is due to the 
authorities realisation that “certain mergers may lead to appreciable detrimental effects on competition in the market 
or markets affected by a proposed merger” (p.213).  
 
In this paper it is argued that the South African anti-dumping law and practice, it is particularly argued that 
the South African anti-dumping legislation, the International Trade Administration Act of 20021 (ITAA), must be 
amended as to clearly mandate the consideration of public interest when imposing an anti-dumping (or safeguard 
measure). The provisions of the ITAA on anti-dumping measures, and the associated regulations and legislation are 
not inimical to such consideration. The provisions of the South African competition legislation clearly espouse 
                                                
International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002. 
P 
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public interest consideration and analysis. But, this has not been without challenges as initially arguments were 
made against the inclusion of public consideration in the competition legislation. One of the arguments has been that 
there were more appropriate and suitable measures and policies to achieve the public interests contained in the Act, 
instead of using the competition policy (Duncan, 1999).   
 
DATA AND METHOD 
 
This article is of an exploratory nature and involves a conceptual analytical approach. Conceptual analysis 
is a technique that treats concepts as classes of objects, events, properties or relationships. The technique involves 
defining the meaning of a given concept precisely by identifying and specifying the conditions under which any 
entity or phenomenon is (or could be) classified under the concept in question. Conceptual analysis is used in order 
to get a better understanding of public interest in South Africa.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The study on which this article is based reviewed relevant literature sources on public interest in the field of 
anti-dumping, competition and direct foreign investment. Also, pertinent policy documents from the Department of 
Trade and Industries website, newspaper reports as well as other research documents relating to anti-dumping, 
competition and FDI were reviewed and analysed. Abstracts from the subject specific journals such as, for example, 
the International Business and Economics Research Journal, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of World 
Trade, the South African Mercantile Law Journal, THRHR, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, and the South 
African Journal of Economics were critically appraised and the full article sought and read if the abstract was 
considered robust and relevant. Some key papers are referenced in view of space limitations. 
 
The literature review results is that scholarship in this area of study falls under those in favour of public 
interest consideration and those against such consideration. Notable in the field of competition are: 
 
• Lewis (2002); Hodge., Goga., and Moahloli (2012) and Reekie (1999) addressing mergers in the field of 
completion law and policy. According to Reekie (1999), employment should not be considered a public 
interest issue for the purposes of completion law, and argues employment issue must be dealt within the 
framework macroeconomic policy. Lewis (2002) points to what the added conditionalities to address public 
interest when the South African completion authorities approve mergers. In particular, these interventions 
are designed to prevent loss of jobs in mergers and acquisitions, and address the past economic imbalances. 
Oxenham (2012) cautions of the un-intended consequences of public interest consideration particularly its 
possible stifling effect.  
 
PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Public Interest in the Anti-Dumping Law and Practice 
 
The South African anti-dumping law is found in the International Trade Administration Act of 2002 
(hereinafter ITAA) as amended, which is designed to establish an anti-dumping regulatory regime that prima facie 
in compliance with the rules of the World Trade Organisation2 (WTO), namely the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,3 (hereinafter Anti-dumping Agreement), and Article 
VI of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The ITAA must be read and interpreted in 
conjunction with the Customs and Excise Act of 19644, the latter being a supplementary legislation. The provisions 
                                                
2See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The 
Legal Texts – The Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 17 (1999) 1869 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in (1994) 33 I.L.M. 
115. 
3WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (Anti-
Dumping Agreement). 
4Customs Tariff Act 26 of 1914. 
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of the ITAA find elaboration in the Anti-Dumping Regulations5 (hereinafter Anti-Dumping Regulations). South 
African anti-dumping law dates back to the Customs Tariff Act 12 of 1914, which was the world’s fourth such 
legislation after legislation of Canada,6 New Zealand,7 and Australia.8  
  
As noted earlier the anti-dumping provisions in the ITAA are designed to establish an anti-dumping 
regulatory regime that prima facie reflects compliance with the Anti-dumping Agreement (Sibanda, 2013a). 
According to section 1(2) of ITAA read with section 12(1) of ADR, and pursuant to article 2.1 of the WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement, dumping is considered to be occurring in South Africa when there predatory price 
discrimination or differential pricing of different units of the same good sold at different prices in different markets 
(Brink, 2004, Sibanda, 2013. See also Viner, 1923,; Viner, 1931).  That is,  “…, a product is to be considered as 
being dumped, i.e., introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price 
of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of 
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country” (Anti-Dumping Agreement, Art 
2.1). Numerous reasons can be provided to justify the imposition of antidumping measures ranging including but not 
limited to preventing predatory trade, price discrimination and protection of infant domestic industries (Sibanda, 
2013a). Generally,  strategic trade policy and consumer welfare arguments are advanced as justifications for anti-
dumping laws (See Messerlin and Tharakan, 1999;  Phillips and Turner,  1975) All these reasons are undergird by 
the “importing country’s desire to protect domestic industry and consumers” (Sibanda, 2013a) from injurious effects 
of dumped goods.   
 
Neither the Anti-dumping Agreement nor GATT Article VI contains a public interest clause, except for the 
provision of Article 6.12, which calls on national authorities to give consumers and intermediate users the 
opportunity to provide information relevant to the investigation and the determination of dumping. According to 
Barfield (2005) WTO Members have argued for the inclusion of the public interest test provision in the Anti-
dumping Agreement in terms of which the effects of anti-dumping orders on the whole national economy could be 
measured. At best the Anti-dumping Agreement makes provision for the adequate notification of all interested 
parties during anti-dumping investigations. For example, Article 6.1 of the Anti-dumping Agreement requires that 
notice of an investigation be given to all interested parties. It reads as follows: 
 
All interested parties in an antidumping investigation shall be given notice of the information which the 
authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in 
respect of the investigation in the question. 
 
Article 6.11 defines the term ‘ interested parties’ to include “(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the 
importer of a product subject to investigation, or a trade or business association and (ii) the Government of the 
exporting Member; and in ‘interested parties”. Furthermore, the term includes not only the exporters and domestic 
producers but also the importers of the product under investigation who are likely to be adversely affected by anti-
dumping actions. Article 6.11 goes on to state that “[]his list does not preclude Members from allowing domestic or 
foreign parties other than those mentioned above to be included as interested parties”. The Anti-dumping Agreement 
thus allows member States to add to the list. For the purposes of this article these may include industrial users and 
consumers whose consideration will be in the public interest. Therefore, such an inclusion in ITAA will not be at 
odds with Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which provides that throughout an anti-dumping 
investigation, all ‘interested parties’ shall have a full opportunity to defend their interests. Part of this defence of 
interests is for the interested parties to be afforded the opportunity to be heard and the opposing views presented and 
rebuttal arguments offered.  
                                                
5Anti-Dumping Regulations of 2003 Notice 123 in Government Gazette No 24287 of 21 January 2003. For regulation before the ITAA see, Guide 
to the Policy and Procedure with regard to Action against Unfair International Trade Practices: Dumping, Subsidies and other Forms of 
Disruptive Competition (1992); Guide to the Policy and Procedure with regard to Action against Unfair International Trade Practices: Dumping, 
Subsidies and other Forms of Disruptive Exports (1994); and Guide to the Policy and Procedure with regard to Action against Unfair 
International Trade Practices: Dumping and Subsidised Exports (1995). 
6An Act to Amend the Customs Tariffs of 1897, 4 Edw VIII, I Canada Statutes 111 1904. 
7Agricultural Implement Manufacturer, Importation and Sale Act of 1905. 
8ndustries Preservation Act of 1906. 
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Anti-dumping measures, such as those imposed in the 2012 Brazilian Fowl Meat case merited public 
interest consideration. This argument is borne by the fact that in casu astronomical tariff increases, which were 
levied by the Minister of Trade and Industry, affected and impacted negatively on consumers’ right to food security. 
On 21 June 2012 Brazil challenged South Africa's preliminary determination and the imposition of provisional anti-
dumping duties on frozen meat of fowls of the species Gallus Domesticus, whole bird and boneless cuts, originating 
in or imported from Brazil, which were published in the ITAC Report No. 389.  The ITAC’s determination was 
made consequent to an application lodged by the South African Poultry Association (SAPA) on behalf of the 
Southern African Custom Union (SACU) industry in February 2012. In casu the DTI made a positive determination 
for to increase the tax on imported poultry products (Sibanda, SILVIA. See also Increase in the Rates of Custom 
Duty on Frozen Meat Fowls of the Gallus Domesticus: Whole Birds, Boneless Cuts, Bone-In Portions, Carcasses 
and Offal: ITAC Report No. 442.)  to control the import and dumping of poultry in South Africa from Brazil. The 
tariffs have been raised on several imported chicken by 8.75 percentage points on average, and 82 percentages on 
whole birds from the 27 percentage in 2012.  The tariff increases were:  increase from 5% to 12% for boneless 
cuts were increased; increase from 27% to 31% for carcasses; and increase from 27% to 30% for offal (Sibanda, 
2013b).  In implementing the tariffs hike the ITAC had to engage in a delicate interests balancing exercise which 
included the gradual the “increasing levels of imports into SACU, and the “concomitant” chipping away of the 
market share of SACU producers of chicken meat; the business and investment that the domestic industry has made 
in the poultry employment opportunities the poultry industry gives to the South African public; the declines in 
profits of the domestic poultry industry due to dumped imports; the price disadvantage faced by domestic industries 
vis-à-vis foreign industries” (Sibanda, 2013b p.790).  
 
Article 6.12 of the Anti-dumping Agreement also requires national authorities to provide opportunities for 
industrial users of the good subject to investigation and representative consumer organisations to provide relevant 
information during investigations. But, this is limited to the cases where the product is commonly sold at the retail 
level. Moreover, the aim of this provision is to enable consumer organizations and industrial users to provide any 
information that is relevant to an antidumping investigation. It must be conceded however, that the provision of 
Article 6.12 of the Anti-dumping Agreement indicates that adversely affected parties (including importers, 
downstream and upstream industrial users and consumers) have no rights but merely privileges and investigating 
authorities conducting an antidumping action are not obliged to take their views seriously. Thus, antidumping duties 
may be imposed even if they are contrary to the public interest.  
 
 In South Africa the Minister of Finance may intervene at the end of the proceedings. The Minister of 
Finance enjoys discretion to impose the anti-dumping duty based on “public interest” considerations. Be that as it 
may, the South African anti-dumping law does not have a comprehensive provision for considering the “public 
interest” before anti-dumping duties can be imposed. But, the anti-dumping authorities have in some disputes given 
due regard to public interest. In the Italie – Ansoek of Pasta case, for example, it was held that public interests are 
important in deciding if the anti-dumping action should be instituted. Recourse to public interest is in the form of an 
enquiry after a directive by the Minister of Trade and Industry to the ITAC. The ADR makes provision for public 
interest considerations, which the ITAC should consider in determining whether or not to impose any type of anti-
dumping duty. Public interest provision in the ADR gives the ITAC broad discretionary powers to determine if there 
are reasonable grounds to conclude that the imposition, amendment or continuation of any type of anti-dumping 
duty, or the imposition, amendment or continuation of an anti-dumping duty in the amount determined in an 
investigation or review proceedings is justified. The ADR provides that the ITAC’s determination of the public 
interest shall be based on consideration of any relevant factors. This is a very important provision because it 
provides a non-peremptory guidance on, and indices of, public interests.  
 
 Public interest may militate against the imposition, amendment or continuation of an anti-dumping duty, or 
for the imposition, amendment or continuation of an anti-dumping duty if (i) it is likely to substantially lessen or 
prevent, or has substantially lessened or prevented, competition in the domestic market for goods or services; (ii) it 
is likely to substantially lessen or has substantially lessened the competitiveness of domestic producers; (iii) it is 
likely to cause significant damage or has caused significant damage to domestic producers that use the product under 
investigation in the production of other goods or the provision of services; (iv) it is likely to significantly restrict, or 
has significantly restricted, consumer access, at competitive prices, to the product under investigation or like 
product, or to other goods produced or services that use the product under investigation as an input; or (v) it is likely 
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to significantly impact, or has significantly impacted, negatively on the public health, the public safety or the 
environment. 
 
 In the light of the critical impact that the imposition of anti-dumping measures have on the general public, 
who are end-users of the product in question, it is prudent that that section 4(2) of the ITAA and the ADR be 
amended to contain a clear provision on “public interest” requiring the ITAC to consider the applicability or not of 
public interests without having to rely on the directive by the Minister of Finance. Part of the amendment should 
include a specific and clear articulation of public interest criteria, and a non-exhaustive list of factors that can guide 
the ITAC on whether and how to conduct a public interest enquiry (See, e.g., Tao, 2006 p107-109). There are of 
cause scholars who argue against such a provision on the basis that the purpose of anti-dumping law was originally 
to protect producers and not consumers (Arajou 2001). In my view, a “public interest” provision fashioned along the 
lines of Article 21.1 of the European Community’s Basic Law could be workable for South Africa. The relevant part 
of Article 21.1 of the Basic Law states: 
 
A determination as to whether the Community interest calls for intervention shall be based on an 
appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interest of the domestic industry and 
users and consumers; and a determination pursuant to this Article shall only be made where all parties have 
been given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to paragraph 2. In such an examination, the 
need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition shall 
be given special consideration. Measures, as may be determined on the basis of the dumping and injury 
found, may not be applied where the authorities, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly 
conclude that it is not in the Community interest to apply such measures. 
 
The current provision of section 4(2) of the ITAA will need to be redrafted to give an indication of the 
basis upon which the Minister of Finance makes a determination that the imports under investigation do not amount 
to irregular trade practice. The provision should permit the consideration of all relevant interests and put the 
elimination of trade-distorting effects of injurious dumping as the main objective.  Similar approaches have been 
witnessed in other jurisdictions. For example, the Singaporean anti-dumping legislation requires the Minister of 
Trade and Industry to consider the “public interest”’ factor. Public interest is the criterion for determining whether to 
institute an anti-dumping investigation in Singapore. The Singaporean Minister of Trade and Industry has a duty to 
confirm, once a petition is received, whether the envisaged anti-dumping investigation is in the public interest. If the 
Minister determines that there is such evidence and that an investigation is in the public interest, the investigation 
would proceed (Hsu 1998). 
 
The United States also implements implicitly the factor of public interest in imposing safeguard measures. 
The United States, for instance, requires that the President uses his discretionary power to implement safeguard 
measures based “implementing relief that provides greater economic and social benefits than costs, with a host of 
additional related factors to be weighed” (See Business Guide to Trade 2001). It has been proposed that the United 
States  change in the United States anti-dumping regime which will make it possible for the President to intervene at 
the end of the process in favour of national interest and introduce a solution which covers both the economic and 
political goals of the United States (Barfield 2005). Barfied (2005) argues that the US Congress has sometimes 
legislated rules and given instructions to the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) that have little 
relevance to injurious dumping, and that members of the USITC have not been “political hacks with neither interest 
in or competence in economic analysis” (p.729). The introduction of such a highly politicised anti-dumping 
provision is not preferred in South Africa. Contrary to what Barfield (2005) observes, fundamental economics still 
plays a significant part in the South African anti-dumping process.  
 
Under European Community anti-dumping rules, it must first be shown that the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures must be in the “Community interest”. Community interest essentially involves a political decision, taking 
into account the interests of users, consumers, and upstream and downstream industries. In short, it must be 
determined that the imposition of such measures will be to the benefit of the overall interest of the EC9 (Business 
                                                
9See Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, 22 December 1995, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 2331/96, 2 December 1996, Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 905/98, 27 April 1998, and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2238/2000, 9 October 2000. 
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Guide to Trade Remedies in the European Community, 2001). Tharakan points out that, in 1994, the EU went a step 
further by amending its “public interest” clause to give consumers some meaningful legal standing in anti-dumping 
cases (Tharakan, 1999). In a more guided manner, Article 21.1 of the Basic Regulation, for example, urges the 
European Commission and the Council to take into account “community interests” before a decision is made to 
impose anti-dumping measures on imports.  
 
Public Interest in the Competition Law and Practice 
 
The Competition Act of 199810 whose primary purpose is to “promote and maintain competition” addresses 
competition or anti-trust issues in line with comparable jurisdictions such as the European Union, US and Canada 
(Minette 2006, Sibanda, 2001.  Duncan 1999 ). In fact, the purposes and objective statement of the South African 
Competition Act was in great part borrowed from the Canadian Competition Act 1 of  2009. The declared purpose 
of the Canadian Competition Act is: 
 
to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the 
Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets while at 
the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and 
medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in 
order to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices. 
 
The South African Act was designed as a tool to combat anti-competition conducts; monopolies and abuse 
of dominant positions. It also carries provisions determining the legality of mergers – be it horizontal mergers, 
vertical mergers, or conglomerate mergers. In terms of the Act the South Africa Competition Commission (SCC) 
has the obligation to  investigate and evaluate mergers and prohibited practices. Furthermore, the SCC can disallow 
small and intermediate mergers, and makes recommendations on larger mergers to the Competition Tribunal. The 
SCC’s decisions may be appealed to the South Africa Competition Tribunal (SACT) and the South African 
Competition Appeal Court (SACAC). 
  
Public interest considerations are explicitly espoused and addressed the Competition Act of 1998. To begin 
with, the preamble of the Act speaks to the need for economic participation and issues of ownership to take into 
account public interest. Section 12A(3) of the Act, for example, makes provision for public interest grounds. The 
provision is couched in peremptory manner  as section 12A(3) specifically list factors that the competition 
authorities “must consider” which include its effect on employment; a particular industrial sector; small businesses , 
or entreprises  owned by historically disadvantaged persons ; and the ability of domestic industries to compete in the 
international markets,   when determining if the proposed merger “can or cannot be justified on public grounds”.  
This is a much stronger and wider commitment to public interest in comparison to public interest consideration 
approach in mergers in the United Kingdom which, for example,  requires the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry to consider national security which includes public security; plurality of media; and stability of the UK 
financial system.11 Section 12A(1)(b) of the Competition Act also uses the word “must”  to place an obligation on 
the competition authorities whenever required to consider a merger to “…determine whether the merger can or 
cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds..” set out in section 12A(3). Section 12A bears some 
resemblance to the provisions of the considerations that the Canadian Minister of Finance should have due regard to 
when determining bank mergers. In terms of the Canadian Competition Act,12 bank mergers, for example, must be 
assessed with due consideration to “possible costs and benefits to customers and small and medium-sized 
businesses, including the impact on branches, availability of financing, price, quality and availability of services; the 
timing and socio-economic impact of any branch closures or alternative service delivery measures at the regional 
level, and any alternative service delivery measures that might mitigate the impact; and what remedial or mitigating 
steps in respect of public interest concerns the banks are prepared to take, such as divestitures, service guarantees 
and other commitments, and what measures to ensure fair treatment of those whose jobs are affected…”  (See 
Susan, 2005). 
                                                
10Amended by the Competition Amendment Act No. 1 of 2009.  
11However, the Secretary of State has powers to add new public interest considerations in terms of the  Enterprise Act 2002. 
12Competition Act, R.S. 1985, c. C-34. 
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Public interests considerations played a major role in a number of cases that came before the South Africa 
Competition Tribunal (SACT) and the South African Competition Commission (SCC) respectively. In the 
Walmart/Massmart merger case, for example, public consideration let to the stringent conditions placed on the 
merger of Walmart and Massmart. The Walmart/Massmart merger controversy arose in 2012 following the 
acquisition of 51% stake in Massmart by Walmart (Kruger 2012). In this case the SACT relied on its public interest 
mandate in terms of the Competition Act that no loss of jobs will happen as a result of the merger. Thus, an 
arrangement was secured for Wallmart/Massmart to establish R100 million programme for the development of local 
South African suppliers (Sibanda, 2012, See DTI, 2013).  Other public interest issues considered in the 
Wallmart/Massmart ruling include, for instance, the country has a challenge of fluctuating rate of employment and it 
would not have been in the interest of the public, and of the Government of South Africa, to unconditionally accept 
the proposed merger (DTI, 2013).  In fact, the South African competition authorities have never been shy to consider 
public interest, particularly in the cases of mergers which have the impact of loss of employment of huge magnitude. 
And, on mergers of potential or real impact on small business.13 In Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum 
Group Limited, for example, the competition authority held that: 
 
Thus if on the facts of a particular case, employment loss is of a considerable magnitude and that short term 
prospects of re-employment for a substantial portion of the affected class are limited, then prima facie this 
would be presumed to have a substantial adverse effect on the public interest and the an evidential burden 
would then shift to the merging parties to justify it before a final conclusion can be made.14   
 
The strong approach of consideration of public interests is not surprising given the fact that issues 
considered are issues addressed in the country’s Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), which is released by the DTI 
since 2007. IPAP issues of poverty and unemployment through the promotion and the protection of manufacturing 
sectors so as to , increase value-added exports and absorb labour. GoSA is gradually moving towards a 
developmental state with greater state intervention in markets through regulation that supports and promote socio-
economic goals and economic activities. In Africa there a number of jurisdictions with legislation that requires 
public interest considerations in competition or anti-trust cases, particularly in mergers and acquisitions including 
Botswana; Malawi; Namibia; Swaziland; Tanzania; and Zambia (Oxenham, 2012).  
 
Some commentators had argued that the ruling will have a chilling effect on FDI. Also, that is brings into 
question the discharge of the country’s WTO obligation, particularly due to performance requirements set for 
multinational companies (Kruger 2012).  The SACT was aware of the possibility of the ruling been challenged for 
non-compliance with WTO requirements, particularly those requirements protecting local suppliers and labour 
rights. But, the ruling was in line with the provisions of the Competition Act in particular section 2 which states as 
the purpose of the Act amongst others the promotion of employment opportunities, and the advancement of socio-
economic welfare of South African especially persons from previously disadvantaged groups. The main 
shortcoming of  the Competition Act is that no mention is made of how one balances competition and public interest 
assessments.  The SACT has in some cases stepped in to guide the SACC on what not to when adjudication issues. 
For example, in the merger between Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd ("SSA") and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd ("Tepco") 
(Case No. 66/LM/Oct01) the SACT cautioned the to be “…extremely careful when, in the name of supporting 
historically disadvantaged investors, it intervenes in a commercial decision by such as (sic) investor" (see Case No. 
66/LM/Oct01, para 49).  In particular, the SACT warned that however well-intentioned the competition authorities 
must “…not to pursue their public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner less they damage precisely those 
interests that they ostensibly seek to protect"  (see Case No. 66/LM/Oct01).  In Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 
("Harmony") and Goldfields Ltd ("Goldfields") (Case No. 93/LM/Nov04) case, which involved a hostile take-over 
bid, the SACT rejected Goldfields’ argument that  a merger should be prohibited even if it does not raise anti-
competition concerns merely on the basis of public interest. According to the SACT the danger with such an 
approach is that it "would render a good measure of the mergers which come before us daily, susceptible to 
prohibition" (Case No. 66/LM/Oct01, para 35). The relevant case law shows some success by South African 
competition authorities in striking  a balance between competition and public interest considerations. Notable is 
                                                
13See Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02 at paras 141-144. 
14Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum Group Limited 41/LM/Jul10, at 21. See also Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd/Northwest Star 
(Pty) Ltd 52/LM/Jul04; Multichoice Subscriber Management (Pty) Ltd v Tiscali 72/LM/Sep04 on the imposition of employment related 
conditions. 
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Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd15 in which the SACT acknowledge the 
possibility of conflicts between different interests at called for the completion authorities to adopt a three-prong 
approach in terms of which:   
 
1. Each asserted public interest ground must be considered in isolation and it must be determined whether 
such ground is substantial. 
2. If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, and there are at least two contradictory grounds, then the 
competition authority must attempt to reconcile the conflicting grounds. 
3. If the competition authority is unable to reconcile the substantial contradictory grounds, then the grounds 
must be balanced and the competition authority must reach a net conclusion as to the public interest.16 
 
Important to note as a balancing act is that the South African competition authorities have acknowledged 
and appreciated the fact that they play a secondary role to other bodies and/or authorities established to deal with 
employment issues such as salaries and basic conditions of employment. In Daun et Cie AG/Kolosus Holdings Ltd17 
the SACT expressed this position succinctly as follows: 
 
We derive some comfort from the knowledge that each of the elements of public interest that we are 
obliged to consider are protected and promoted by legislation and institutions specifically designed for that 
purpose – hence, the merged entity would not be able to alter unilaterally employment conditions and 
agreed bargaining arrangements. While this cannot provide the basis for us shying away from tough 
decisions, it does place our own role in these matters in correct perspective. At most, our role is ancillary to 
these other statutes and institutions; it is supportive of their general thrust and should, by and large, not be 
employed as a substitute for, and in order to second-guess, these other interventions.18 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Public policy interest considerations in South Africa may be regarded as having deterrent effects ( Smith 
2003. See generally Seldeslachts, Clougherty,  and Barros, 2009).  But, such a consideration it a necessary evil.  The 
South African socio-economic situation is unique and merit further development and consideration of public 
interest. Not only is South Africa a developing country, it has suffered one of the most socio-economic injustices in 
the past. Some of the injustices where either perpetrate or encouraged by multinational corporation – and it will take 
some time to reverse the effects particularly in the case of the previously disadvantaged groups. Considering public 
interest in anti-dumping and competition law and practice remains an issue of national importance.  The GoSA’s 
policy space with respect in particular to ensuring that not only do trade measures achieve stabilisation of the overall 
competitiveness of domestic industries but also takes into account the impact of such measures on other public 
interests.  
 
The current WTO Anti-Agreement imposes no substantive obligation on the authorities to take the broader 
public interest into account because anti-dumping investigations are mainly initiated at the instance of producers. 
But, neither does the Agreement preclude national authorities from considering public interests in their anti-dumping 
determinations. Thus, countries like Canada, for example, in terms of the public interest provisions enacted in 1984 
go for the view that producer interest provisions in anti-dumping legislation and regulations is too narrow a 
conception, thus making important to explicitly refer to and take into account public interest. The express addition of 
“public interest” as a factor to be considered when making determinations for anti-dumping in South Africa should 
not be seen as aimed at making it difficult for domestic industries to receive relief from the ITAC. Interestingly, 
public interest is considered in the South African competition policy. And, such consideration of public interest has 
not defeated the aimed and objectives of the competition policy.  
 
In the area of competition and investment South Africa has witnessed a strong jurisprudence requiring the 
taking into account public interest provision. As noted, for example, public interest considerations are central to the 
                                                
15 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02.   
16 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd Ibid at 217. 
17 Daun et Cie AG/Kolosus Holdings Ltd 10/LM/Mar03. 
18 Daun et Cie AG/Kolosus Holdings Ltd 10/LM/Mar03, ibid, par124. 
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fabric of the Competition Act of 1998, particularly in relation to mergers and exemptions. Also, the Competition 
Act’s pre-ambular statement that declares that efforts to regulate the economy and to transfer the economic 
ownership make take into account or keep with public interest in the form of “the interests of workers, owners and 
consumers.” (See generally case law  Anglo American Holdings Limited /Kumba Resources Limited (Industrial 
Development Corporation Intervening).   
 
Admittedly, public interest considerations may produce un-intended consequences when, for example,  
authorities imposes overly restrictive and burdensome behavioural remedies, as has been the case in South Africa  
(Oxenham 2012). However, public interest considerations in the South African anti-dumping  and competition 
practice cannot be equated to an unruly horse which has bolted out of the barn to the swimming pool. It has been 
applied circumspectively with appropriate balancing considerations put in place. 
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